Introduction
At the macroeconomic level, the Chinese economic reform program produced rapid and sustained growth and improvements in material welfare. In the period from the late 1970s to the early 1990s, per capita GDP more than quadrupled (ZTN, 2000) . However, the benefits of reform were distributed unevenly. Income and welfare rose more quickly in the eastern seaboard provinces than in the western and interior ones (Chen and Fleisher 1996 , Fleisher and Chen 1997 , Gustafsson and Li 1998 , Lee 2000 . Less well known is the impact of the reforms on the differences between men's and women's earnings.
As Becker (1971) pointed out, when workers can choose among employers, firms that discriminate and pay disfavored groups less than their marginal revenue product and favored groups more than their marginal revenue product will suffer a cost disadvantage. The cost disadvantage arises not only from overpaying favored groups but also from the displacement of higher skilled, discriminated against workers by less skilled but favored workers. All else equal, managers whose compensation is linked to the profitability of the firm are less likely to discriminate than those who are unaffected by the higher cost structure.
China's economic reforms increased managers' ability to discriminate by decentralizing wage setting to firms. At the same time, the reforms increased the managers' stake in the cost effectiveness of the firm and bequeathed workers a newfound freedom to change jobs and choose employers. If managers are generally more prone to discriminate than were the pre-reform centralized wage scales, the reforms could have set opposing forces in motion. Thus, the question arises as to whether the more liberalized sectors have larger or smaller gender pay gaps than the less liberalized sectors. We investigate this question using differences in institutional structure, i.e., enterprise ownership, age of the enterprise, and method of job-seeking, as proxies for the degree to which wage and employment decisions are influenced by market forces.
Pondering the effects of a decade of reform on the condition of women in urban China, Khan (1996) , writes that women clearly shared in the benefits of reforms, but that little solid evidence exists to determine if they benefited proportionately more or less than men. More recent works suggest increasing disparities between men's and women's incomes in China (Maurer-Fazio et al.1999 , Li and Gustafsson 1999 , Chen Gang et al. 1999 , and Rawski 2002 . Evidence from other transition economies indicates growing wage gaps. Brainerd (1998) finds that wage inequality in Russia nearly doubled in the first two to three years of wage and price liberalization and that, although women's mean earnings were 79.5 of men's in 1991, they fell to only 63.5 percent of men's by 1994. In a comparison of the gender wage gaps among the transition economies of Central and Eastern European, Brainerd (1997) finds the gender wage gaps to be larger, in both absolute and relative terms, in Russia and the Ukraine, and smaller in Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Bulgaria and the Czech and Slovak Republics. She argues that the crosscountry differences in the gender wage gaps are primarily due to differences in the degree of wage-setting decentralization rather than differences in macroeconomic performance across countries.
Differences in wage structures across industries, firms, and nations have proven to be important factors in explaining gross wage gaps between skill, racial, and gender groups (Juhn, et al. 1991 , Bronars and Famulari, 1997 , and Abowd et al. 1999 . Blau and Kahn (1996) show that the persistently high, by international standards, gender wage gap in the United States is due in large part to a substantial and increasing level of overall wage inequality in the U.S. Employing a US-based survey of white-collar workers, Bronars and Famulari (1997) find that 35 to 40 percent of between-firm wage differentials are due to differences in the wage structures of the firms with the remainder due to between-firm differences in employee characteristics. They also report that withinfirm gender wage differentials are smaller than across-firm ones and that much of the male-female gap for less educated and less experienced workers is due to the crowding of women into low-paying firms. Clearly, differences in wage structure must not be overlooked when analyzing differences in gender wage gaps.
Although the cross-section nature of our data 2 prohibits us from examining directly the changes in women's earnings relative to men's earnings over the course of the reforms, we use sectoral variation in the degree of market liberalization to infer the effects of the reforms. 3 We exploit sectoral variation in wage dispersion to explore how much of the differences in the wage gaps is due to differences in wage structures, and focus on how institutional differences affect the relative incomes of working women and men in China's urban labor markets. In sections 5.1 to 5.3, we measure the extent of gender wage differentials in a large, micro-level data set. These sections employ techniques developed by Blinder (1973) , Oaxaca (1973) , and Neumark (1988) to decompose the gross wage differentials into components attributable to differences in observed characteristics, i.e., education, work experience and household characteristics, and differences in labor-market treatment. We then explore how differences in the degree of market liberalization affect these components by employing measures of enterprise ownership, enterprise age, and workers' methods of finding employment as proxies for market liberalization. In section 5.4, we use the techniques developed by Juhn et al. (1991) to ascertain the extent to which sectoral differences in wage dispersion contribute to the differences in gender wage gaps.
Urban China's Changing Labor Market Institutions and Women's Status
China's pre-reform labor system was the antithesis of a free market system. The state claimed ownership of labor services and bureaucratically assigned workers to enterprises for life. Workers' preferences concerning occupation or location mattered little. For the enterprises' part, managers had to accept any and all workers allocated to them. Enterprises could not recruit particularly well-qualified workers, nor could they fire unproductive workers. The wage system was not designed to promote productivity and motivate workers but rather to provide egalitarian incomes. Toward this goal, the Chinese wage system enjoyed a modicum of success. Chinese workers, men and women, received nearly equal pay regardless of their efforts, productivity, or performance.
When reforms were initiated in the late-1970's, concerns about open unemployment and social instability caused the Chinese leadership to embark on a slow, evolutionary transition to a market economy. The demands for more flexible and efficient labor markets brought by a new generation of profit-motivated managers were resisted initially, experimented with, and introduced only gradually. Yet even these initial, tentative steps toward market rationalization rapidly yielded profound changes in China's labor system. Workers gained the freedom to choose where and for whom they would work. A vibrant private sector emerged in which managers had the right to determine the size and composition of their work force. Most importantly, a strong movement towards decentralized, productivity-determined remuneration arose. Wage variation across workers and sectors increased relative to the pre-reform period (MaurerFazio et al. 1999) . Chinese workers experienced considerable change in their work environment.
Chinese women's work experience, status, and pay are affected by a complex interplay of newly-introduced market forces, a legacy of centralized work place institutions, traditional beliefs that women are subordinate to men, and a socialist ideology of gender equality. Confucian thought and beliefs continue to exert influence on Chinese society 4 and contribute to gender discrimination in the work place. Under socialism, the traditional low status of women in Chinese society was to become an artifact of the past. The Chinese constitution guaranteed women equal rights with men in all spheres of life and assured equal pay for equal work. 5 In the first decades of the revolution, women's work was promoted with the slogan that women hold up half of heaven, a traditionally male realm (Croll, 1995) . Work was symbolically important in both liberating and providing equality for women (Croll, 1995) .
Chinese women appear to have internalized the ideology and rhetoric that participation in paid labor would improve their status dramatically. Women exhibited a strong sense of entitlement to a good job (Loscocco and Bose, 1998) . Urban female labor force participation on the eve of reform was close to 90 percent (Croll, 1997) 6 and women's labor force attachment was extremely strong. Despite the rhetoric of equality, gender wage differentials persisted in rural areas. Accounts of urban young people sent to rural areas indicate that women on the communes were paid less than men even when carrying out the same tasks (Chan et al., 1999 , Zhai, 1992 . However, the centrallyadministered wage grade system in effect in urban areas made such overt discrimination less likely. On the eve of the reforms, China's urban gender wage gap was small by international comparison.
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With the advent of economic reform, wage plans were decentralized to local authorities, allowing employers to diverge from national wage scales. Coverage of the wage grade system narrowed, as private sector along with township and village enterprises were exempted from it. Bonuses, paid out of retained earnings, became an important component of workers' total monetary compensation. Workers' earnings became linked to their own productivity and managers' compensation to the profitability of their enterprises. The decentralization of remuneration decisions allowed managers much more leeway in rewarding productivity.
The reduction in government involvement in the labor market meant that managers had more freedom to engage in discriminatory practices. Thus, the subordination of, and discrimination against, women in Chinese society would reemerge and reduce women's share of the gains from economic reform. Meng (2000) argues contrarily that the programs promoting gender equality in China during the socialist period were effective in changing social attitudes towards women, as evidenced by wage gaps up to 1995 that remained small by both international comparison and in relation to wage gaps in Taiwan, an area sharing a common cultural heritage. In contrast to Meng, Maurer-Fazio et al.(1999) and Li and Gustafsson (1999) report increasing male-female wage gaps for urban workers in China and suggest that wage gaps are largest in the sectors having the most market influence. Over the course of the reforms, managers undoubtedly gained a much greater stake in the profitability of their enterprises, which implies, ceteris paribus, less likelihood of their engaging in costly discrimination. Does it follow that the increase in size of the wage gap implies that managers are increasingly engaging their tastes for discrimination?
Obviously, many factors are involved in the complex and changing milieu of the urban work place in China. The Chinese labor market has become more varied, with some firms clinging to the employment practices of the socialist period and others hiring, firing and compensating workers in response to market forces and the desire to maximize profit. With such diversity in the labor market, systematic differences in wage structure that could affect the size of the gender wage gap may have emerged. Differences in the wage structure across different types of Chinese firms could influence the relative size of the wage gap. For example, suppose that women have less education on average than men, and that this difference is the same between state-owned and joint-venture enterprises. If the return to education were higher in joint-venture firms than in stateowned firms, we would observe a larger gender wage gap in the joint-venture firms. Thus, competition for educated workers by joint-venture firms could lead to larger gender wage gaps, ceteris paribus. We use these variations in the Chinese labor market to examine the effects of liberalization on the economic status of Chinese women.
Motivation and Methodology
If the state was effectively protecting women from discriminatory remuneration schemes in the pre-reform period, it is quite possible that, in the reform period, we would observe increased discrimination against women in the more competitive and less controlled sectors of the labor market. We examine this issue by dividing our crosssectional data along three dimensions, each associated with varying degrees of market liberalization. Using the Oaxaca (1973 ), Blinder (1973 ), and Neumark (1988 decomposition methods, we analyze differences in the size and composition of the resulting gender wage differentials. We examine how the relative wages of men and women vary across three types of firm ownership, namely, state, collective, and jointventures. In the state-owned sector, ultimate control rests with agencies of the national government. Collective enterprises are owned by local communities or local governments. The joint-venture enterprises involve offshore investors.
Although they have changed rapidly in recent years, state-owned enterprises maintain many restrictive employment practices in our survey year. We expect the spread of market forces to affect least the state-owned enterprises in which restrictions on hiring, dismissals, transfers, and pay were much more severe than in collectives or jointventures. We expect that the joint-venture enterprises function in more competitive labor markets and have the most flexible wage payment schemes. The need to generate profit for the private sector partner is likely to reduce the ability of the managers of jointventure firms to engage in costly discriminatory practices.
China's course of reform was gradual, partial, and unevenly implemented. Yet by the mid-1980s, two significant sets of enterprise reforms arose. The first allowed firms to retain a share of their profits and the second allowed managers to exchange commodities produced outside the plan in markets (Rawski,1994) . In late 1984, the Communist Party Central Committee promulgated the idea that workers' effort and productivity be linked closely to material reward (Child, 1994) . Profit motivation and the possibility of tying reward to effort began to affect managers' resource allocation decisions, in particular their labor allocation decisions. However, given the established agent and client relationships of the pre-reform period, the persistence of learned behavior, and the gradual and uneven implementation of reform policies, we predict that newer firms are more much more likely to face harder budget constraints than older firms, regardless of ownership type. In addition, enterprises formed after the initiation of reforms, regardless of ownership type, are likely to be relatively free of the legacy of egalitarian wage policies. We expect that newly-created firms are more susceptible to competitive pressures than their pre-reform counterparts.
To examine the effect of these possibilities on the relative wages of women, we divide the sample by age of enterprise and enterprise ownership simultaneously. We classify firms created in 1984 and before as old and those firms created in 1985 or after as new. We chose 1984 as the pivotal year for three reasons. First, the initial tranches of industrial reform measures were in effect by that date (Jefferson and Rawski, 1994) . Second, the Party promulgated the policy of linking effort and reward in that year. Third, a change in regulations in that year permitted enterprises to engage in open recruitment practices (Child, 1994) .
Another important change in Chinese labor markets is the increasing use of competitive channels, rather than state labor bureaus, by firms wishing to fill vacancies and by employees seeking new positions. Competitive job seekers participated in open competitive exams and obtained their jobs through employment agency referrals. Labor bureaus assigned workers to their employers upon completion of their schooling or demobilization from the armed services. In addition, many workers obtained their jobs through recommendations from friends or relatives, by replacing their parents within an enterprise, or by being transferred. We expect that, when jobs are obtained competitively, as is increasingly common, the relative abilities of employees, rather than personal tastes or relationships, dominate the employment decision. Thus, we divide our sample accordingly and compare the effects of competitive job search to job assignment on the size and composition of the gender wage gap. Finally, we examine the influence of wage structure and gender, the relative size of wage gaps in state enterprises and both collective and joint-ventures using the methodology developed by Juhn, et al. (1991) . This method allows us to evaluate the contribution of qualifications, measured prices, relative gender inequality between ownership types, and to discern inter-sectoral differences in overall residual inequality between men and women.
Decomposing the Gender Wage Gap
We use the well-known procedure developed by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) to analyze the composition of the gender wage gap, splitting the total gender wage differential into two components. One part of the differential is attributable to gender differences in observed characteristics, e.g., education, and the other part is the residual gap attributable to differences in the male and female returns to these observed characteristics. This residual, or unexplained, component of the wage gap is generally attributed to discrimination, but it could be due to differences in unobserved characteristics. In our analysis, we present decompositions of the gender wage gap calculated using the Oaxaca/Blinder method under the assumption that the male wage structure would be the nondiscriminatory wage structure, as is likely in Chinese labor markets. As a check, we present decompositions calculated using the Neumark (1988) method, which assumes a pooled wage structure as the nondiscriminatory wage structure. We next examine the source of differences in the gender wage gaps between different ownership sectors using the method developed by Juhn, et al. (1991) . Surveys were collected from 9,397 individuals working in 430 different commercial and industrial enterprises under different forms of ownership located in 26 cities in 12 provinces. In each city, the local labor bureau was asked to select randomly 20 to 25 enterprises from a list of those under its jurisdiction with more than fifty employees. Once an enterprise was included in the sample, a worker survey was administered to randomly selected employees. The employee questionnaire dealt with demographic characteristics, employment history, wages and compensation, on-the-job training, mobility and migration, working conditions, time allocation, and relationships between workers and their enterprises. Our sample consists of all state, collective, and jointventure employees with reported income in 1991 and having no missing values in critical variables for a total of 3,453 males and 2,697 females.
The workers are relatively young and well educated. The mean age of male and female employees is 36 and 32.5 years, respectively. Educational attainments of men and women differ little; males have a mean of 11.4 years of schooling while the mean for females is 11.3 years. At the top end of the educational scale, eight percent of males and four percent of females report university graduation. 9 The men in this sample work 47.5 hours per week and earn 198 yuan per month on average while the women work an average of 47.1 hours per week and earn 170 yuan per month. The majority of workers have long-term attachments to their enterprises; only 21 and 28 percent of male and female workers, respectively are contract and temporary workers. Table A1 in the Appendix presents sample means and proportions of key variables by enterprise ownership.
Only 48 percent of the males and 39 percent of the females work in state-owned enterprises; 32 percent of males and 39 percent of females work in collectively-owned enterprises and 20 percent of males and 22 percent of females work in privately-owned or joint-venture enterprises. These figures are not reflective of the labor force, 10 but rather of a survey design which attempted to select adequately sized samples of state-owned, collectively-owned, and joint-venture enterprises in each city.
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Enterprise surveys were also administered to each firm in the sample. Of the 422 firms in the enterprise survey that reported ownership, 173 were classified as stateowned, 145 as collectively-owned and 99 as joint-ventures. Firms declared as jointventures had both Chinese and foreign partners. Of the 83 joint-ventures for which the source of Chinese capital is reported, 56 percent were funded by municipallyadministered enterprises and 17 percent by provincially-administered enterprises. Of the 92 joint-ventures reporting foreign funding, 61 percent listed Hong Kong as their first source of funding and 13 percent listed Taiwan. The firms in the enterprise sample employed over 467,000 people. Women made up 39 percent of the total number of employees and the percentage of women employees varied quite dramatically by ownership. Women constituted 35 percent of the labor force of state-owned firms, 45 percent of the collectively-owned firms and 51 percent of the joint-venture firms.
12 Half the firms in the survey began operation before 1969 and half on or after that year. However, we have chosen 1984 as a pivotal year for classifying firms as old or new. According to this scheme, employees worked at 242 older firms, that began operation before 1985 and 88 newer firms that started operation in or after 1985. Table 1 reports several measures of income dispersion by ownership sector and gender, namely the coefficient of variation of the natural log of monthly income, the difference in log income of the workers at the 90 th and 10 th percentiles of the distribution and the differences in log income of the workers at the 50 th and 10 th percentiles from those at the 90 th and 50 th percentiles. As the table indicates, income is much more dispersed in the joint-venture sector than in either of the other sectors.
[ Table 1 Here]
The decompositions of the gender wage gap are derived from the following wage equation, estimated for each subgroup 13 :
The dependent variable is the natural log of total monthly income, ln( . Although the survey's measure of monthly income includes reported wages, bonuses, work subsidies, ) w and income in kind, it excludes the value of medical care, pension accruals, and employer-provided housing. The independent variables include a series of dummy variables reflecting educational attainment, ED, a vector Z of other observed personal and job-related characteristics including classification of a worker wage grade system (cadre, worker, or ungraded), wage payment type (hourly, piece rate, fixed wage, floating wage), party membership, industrial classification, and provincial location. 14 Measures of both total work experience and tenure at the current employer and their squared values are also included.
We also include measures of family size and the number of children under 15 years of age as independent variables, HOME. While it is more typical to use family variables when estimating labor force participation than earnings, we hypothesize that the effect of these variables on women's labor supply may be of a somewhat different nature in China than in Western countries. In the West, the presence of children, especially young children, affects primarily women's labor force participation and attachment. However, in China, women's labor force participation and attachment are particularly high. We think that the great variation in child care arrangements plus the large role played by women in home production may cause some women to be unable or unwilling to take certain types of jobs, or to extend their job search beyond their city of residence. We include the child and family variables to control for the possible effects of these restrictions and choices on earnings.
The results of our analysis of differences in the Chinese gender wage gap, based on a richly-detailed worker survey, are presented in the following section. The Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) decomposition method is used to evaluate differences in the gender wage gap across firm ownership type, age of the firm, and the employees' job search method. The Neumark (1988) decomposition method is also used to confirm our assumption that in China the male wage is the proper no-discrimination base wage. The Juhn et al. (1991) decomposition method is used to examine whether differences in gender wage gaps across ownership types is due to gender discrimination or due to differences in overall inequality between ownership types.
Decomposition Results

Enterprise Ownership
Enterprise ownership is used as a proxy for liberalization because state-owned enterprises are relatively restricted in their hiring and dismissals. They are affected by a legacy of egalitarian wage policies stemming from a period of soft budget constraints, in which profitability was not a managerial priority. The joint-venture firms face harder budget constraints due to the need to generate profits for their off-shore investors. We speculate that the collective firms are intermediate cases since their budget constraints are clearly firmer than those in the state-sector. However, these firms may be less profitdriven than their joint-venture counterparts. The local community or local government owners may impose alternative goals such as employment creation.
We first examine how the relative wages of men and women vary with these three types of firm ownership. As Table 2 indicates, the ordering of average wages is consistent over ownership type and gender, with joint-venture enterprises paying the most and collectives paying the least. The results of the wage decompositions, also shown in Table 2 , reveal that state-owned enterprises have the smallest male-female wage differentials of the three ownership types. State-owned enterprises also have the smallest unexplained wage differential by both the Oaxaca and Neumark procedures.
[ Table 2 Here] From these results, it appears that the proliferation of collective and joint-venture enterprises over the course of the reforms is unlikely to have improved the relative economic position of female workers. The male-female wage differential is largest in the most liberalized sector, which also has the largest fraction of the wage gap unexplained by human capital, job-related, or other observed characteristics. However, differences in the dispersion of wages by ownership sector could imply that women's wages are a lower fraction of men's wages in a particular sector even if the gap in wages is itself constant across sectors. Despite the fact that the gender wage differential is largest in the jointventure sector, women's relative standing, as measured by the position of the median woman's income in the men's income distribution is the highest in this sector. The median woman's income falls at the 38.6 percentile of men's income in the joint-venture sector, at the 32.3 percentile in the collective sector and at the 35.7 percentile in the stateowned sector. Hence, the large gender wage gap and unexplained residual in the most competitive sector are offset by the improvement in women's standing measured in this way.
Despite the mixed picture of the relative position of women's pay in joint-venture enterprises, their pay is unarguably higher than that of women working in the other two ownership sectors. Women in joint-venture enterprises earn an average of 16 percent more than their state enterprise counterparts and 28 percent more than female workers in collective enterprises. Women in joint-ventures earn slightly more on average than men employed in state enterprises. Moreover, in our sample, the percentage of women employees by ownership varies markedly; women constitute 35 percent of the labor force of state-owned firms, 45 percent of the collectively-owned firms and 51 percent of the joint-venture firms. Thus women make up a relatively large share of the labor force where their wages are highest.
15 Maurer-Fazio et al. (1999) attribute much of the gender wage gap in China's urban labor markets to industrial segregation, that is, the crowding of women into lowpaying industries. If women are crowded into low-paying industries by discriminatory labor bureaus our underlying regressions, which control for industry, may be explaining away part of the problem that we wish to examine. When we re-estimate our model excluding the dummy variables that control for industrial sector, we find that the percentage of the wage gap that remains unexplained by differences in observed characteristics grows. In the state-owned sector, the unexplained proportion of the wage differential increases from 21 percent to 30 percent according to the Neumark method. In the collective sector, the unexplained portion grows from 43 to 49 percent and, in the joint-venture sector, it grows from 47 to 50 percent. These results imply that women are subject to industrial segregation. The sector thought to have protected women, i.e. the state sector, has the largest percentage point increase in the unexplained gap when the industry controls are omitted. However, given that the earnings gap measured in yuan per month is smallest in this sector, the net effect of industrial segregation on monthly earnings is not necessarily larger than in the other sectors. 16 Even after removing industry controls, the proportion of the wage gap explained by differences in human capital and other characteristics remains highest in the state sector. 
Age of the Enterprise
The distinction between various ownership types may be sharpened if we further divide the sample according to the age of the enterprise. Enterprises of all types formed during the post-reform period were founded in a more competitive atmosphere. By virtue of not having a long-standing agent or client relationship with government authorities, we predict that the newer firms are better positioned to take advantage of the liberalization of the labor and product markets. In addition, this reduced relationship with the government means that firms formed in the post-reform period face harder budget constraints, which limit managers' ability to engage in costly discrimination. Firms founded after the implementation of reforms are also free of most, if not all, vestiges of the earlier legacy of egalitarian wages and thus operate in a more competitive environment than older enterprises. Of course, the decentralization of control over remuneration also means that individual managers can indulge their tastes for discrimination. If the effects of profit motivation outweigh the effects of the new-found freedom to discriminate, we expect to see women doing better in new enterprises of all types than in older ones. The results by enterprise age are presented in Table 3 , and the evidence is mixed.
[ Table 3 Here] Looking first at older enterprises, the female-male wage gap is still smallest at state firms and largest at joint-venture enterprises. However, in a change of ordering, the fraction of the wage gap unexplained by differences in observed characteristics is largest at collective enterprises and second largest at the joint-venture enterprises but still smallest in the state sector. How do women fare in newer enterprises? Unfortunately, the sample size for new state-owned enterprises is only nine firms and 107 employees and too small to analyze. In new collective enterprises, both male and female workers have lower mean wages in comparison to their colleagues in the older collectives. Measured in yuan per month, the female-male wage gap is lower in the new collectives but the ratio of women's to men's wages is almost identical. The fraction of the wage gap unexplained by differences in observed characteristics is higher in the newer collectives according to the Oaxaca measure, but lower according to the Neumark measure. While the absolute pay of both men and women is lower in the new collectives than in the older enterprises, our results do not yield a definitive answer as to whether women's relative situation improves or worsens. Table 3 indicates that women in new joint-venture enterprises experience slightly lower relative wages than their counterparts at older joint-venture enterprises. Both the female-male wage gap and the unexplained portion of the gap are higher at new jointventure enterprises. However, the absolute wages of both men and women are higher at new joint-venture enterprises compared with older joint-venture enterprises. While newer joint-venture enterprises, arguably the firms participating in the most liberalized labor markets, pay higher mean wages for women than the older firms, women's mean earnings relative to men's have declined, because male wages have increased even more.
Job Search Channel
During the socialist period, workers were assigned to jobs. Workers could not refuse assignments, nor could enterprises refuse to accept new employees. Many of the respondents in our survey obtained their jobs in this way, while others found employment by competitive processes. On the one hand, if the job assignment process incorporated the socialist egalitarian ethic and protected women from traditional discriminatory practices, its removal could allow the re-emergence of such practices and the crowding of women into low paying positions and sectors. On the other hand, if the job assignment system previously crowded women into low paying industries, competition for jobs could allow women to be judged on qualifications. Thus, escape from socialist control in job assignments could either hurt or help women.
We classified workers' job attainment method as competitive if they participated in open competitive exams or were referred by an employment agency and as assigned if they were assigned to the enterprise by a government bureau on completion of their education or on demobilization from the army. We did not have enough information to classify workers as simply competitive or assigned if they obtained their job through the recommendations of friends or relatives or by transfer; thus we dropped these cases from our sample. We presume that assigned jobs in state-owned enterprises comprise the least liberalized sector of the labor market, while jobs found competitively in joint-venture enterprises comprise the most liberalized channel. The results of this analysis, presented in Table 4 , show the clearest evidence of liberalization helping women in the labor market. For women in competitively-obtained state-sector jobs, the unexplained gap even becomes negative.
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[ Table 4 Here]
Competitive positions within joint-venture enterprises are arguably the most liberalized segment of the labor market in our data. Regardless of the percentage of the wage gap unexplained by observed characteristics, the actual female-male wage gap, is less than seven percent, which is the smallest we found and reveals significant earnings equality between male and female workers. Even though the unexplained portion of the wage gap is 10 percentage points higher by the Oaxaca method for those who found their jobs competitively, and even more by the Neumark method, the discriminatory wage gap is negligible in yuan terms.
19 Notably, the wage ratio for competitive, joint-venture enterprise jobs is higher than the wage ratio for state-owned enterprise jobs. This result weakens the argument that the state acts as the great equalizer or the protector of women versus competitive firms.
The Effects of Wage Structure
Suppose that, after controlling for observed characteristics, the relative standings of women were the same across state, collective and joint-venture enterprises. For example, the mean woman's wage ranks the same across ownership types at the 30 th percentile of the men's residual wage distribution. However, suppose that overall inequality of men's earnings is larger in joint-ventures because the variance of the residual wage distribution is larger in joint-ventures. Oaxaca and Neumark decompositions performed in such a situation will show a larger unexplained gender wage gap for joint-ventures compared to state enterprises, even though discrimination, defined as moving women down the male residual wage distribution, is no worse in jointventures than in state enterprises. The wider dispersion of wages in joint-ventures imposes a larger absolute penalty on women for a given deficit on the male residual wage distribution. We examine how such differences in wage structure may affect our findings.
Using the Juhn (1991) method, we decompose the differences in gender wage gaps between ownership types into four components, namely, the effects of differences in mean observed characteristics, the effects of differences in the observed returns to these characteristics (observed prices), the effects of differences in women's ranking on the male residual wage distribution (the gap effect), and the differences in overall residual inequality (unobserved prices). Our results are presented taking the gender wage gap at state enterprises as the base to evaluate the putatively more liberalized practices in joint and collective enterprises relative to the more restrictive employment practices of the state enterprises.
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Results of the Juhn decomposition are presented in Table 5 . The first column in the top panel shows that the mean woman's position on the men's residual wage scale contributes little to the relative gender wage gaps. For all types of firms, the mean woman's position on the men's residual wage scale is between around 42 and 47 percent, indicating little difference between the average man's and average woman's wage within ownership types after controlling for observable characteristics, and little difference in the relative placement of women across ownership types.
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[ Table 5 Here]
The remainder of the table contains the Juhn decomposition results. The second column in the top panel reports the mean gender wage gap within each ownership sector. The third column, i.e. the Difference in Difference, reports the differences between the state-enterprise wage gap and the wage gaps in the collective and joint sectors, respectively, and this quantity is decomposed into its component parts. The four columns in the middle panel contain the components of this Juhn decomposition. The column labeled Gap confirms that the contribution to the relative wage gap of the mean women's placement on the men's residual distribution is negligible at only about one percent of the total difference to be explained in both types of enterprises.
The column labeled Unobserved Prices indicates that a higher level of residual wage dispersion in both collective and joint enterprises accounts substantially for the larger gender wage gap in these enterprises than in state enterprises. In other words, higher residual wage inequality in collective and joint enterprises imposes a larger wage penalty on women for either shortfalls in mean observable characteristics or wage discrimination compared with state enterprises. Residual wage inequality accounts for 86 percent of the relative gender pay gap between collective and state enterprises and for 77 percent of the relative gap between joint-venture and state enterprises.
Observed characteristics have differential effects on the relative wage gap at collective and joint enterprises. This component is positive for joint enterprises, indicating that the women in these enterprises have favorable relative levels of observed characteristics. However, women in collective enterprises have somewhat less favorable levels of observed characteristics relative to women in state enterprises. The effect of observed prices is positive for collective enterprises, meaning that male returns to the observed characteristics increases the gender wage gap in collective enterprises relative to state enterprises. However, the effect is negative for joint enterprises, indicating that observed prices tend to mitigate the relative gender wage gap between state enterprises and joint-venture enterprises.
The final panel of Table 5 aggregates gender specific effects, i.e. the observed characteristics plus the gap effects, and wage structure effects, i.e., the observed prices plus unobserved prices. The positive gender-specific effects for women working in joint enterprises reflect their favorable levels of observed characteristics compared to women in state enterprises. Conversely, women working in collective enterprises have somewhat less favorable levels of observed characteristics relative to state-enterprise women workers. However, the large and opposite-signed wage structure effects swamp the effect of these observed characteristics in collective enterprises. The positive wage structure effects for both types of enterprises indicate that the higher degree of overall wage inequality increases significantly the gender wage gaps relative to state enterprises. For collective enterprises, wage inequality at 129% is more than sufficient to account for the higher wage gap in such enterprises. For joint enterprises, wage inequality accounts for around 60 percent of the larger gender wage gaps relative to state enterprises.
The results of the Juhn decompositions indicate that wage structure issues must be taken into account when evaluating the effects of market liberalization on the economic status of women. After controlling for observable characteristics, we find little difference across enterprise types in the average woman's placement on the men's residual wage distribution. However, the wage penalty to women from even this small disadvantage is relatively large in both collective and joint-venture enterprises, because the residual wage inequality in both these ownership types is quite large. Therefore, our results suggest that economic liberalization may not lead to increased gender discrimination per se, but rather that economic liberalization leads to increases in overall wage inequality that disproportionately affects women.
Conclusion
We investigate whether the economic reform process in China has worked to women's relative advantage or disadvantage by focusing on one observable aspect of women's economic status, namely, their earnings relative to men's. Working with crosssection data, we cannot observe directly the changes in women's relative earnings over the course of the reforms but we are able to exploit sectoral variation in the degree of market liberalization to infer the effects of the reforms on earnings. Consistent with Maurer-Fazio et al. (1999) and Li and Gustafsson (1999) , we find wage gaps to be largest in the most liberalized sector, i.e., the joint-venture sector, smaller in the collective sector, and smallest in the least liberalized sector, i.e. the state sector. The proportion of this gap left unexplained by differences in observable characteristics, i.e., the proportion often attributed to discrimination, is largest in the joint-venture sector and smallest in the state-owned sector. Thus, at first glance, labor market liberalization in China appears not to work to women's advantage but rather to their disadvantage.
Our findings indicate that looking at the size of gender wage gaps only yields an incomplete picture of women's relative economic standing. First, the decline in women's pay relative to men's is offset by an absolute increase in wages. Both women and men in the more liberalized joint-venture sector earn more than their counterparts in the state and collective sectors. Second, when we consider the position of the median woman's earnings on the men's income distribution, we find that women's relative standing is highest in the joint-venture sector. Third, when we proxy for the degree of liberalization in the labor market by identifying two groups within our sample, namely, those assigned to their jobs and those who found their employment competitively in the market place, we find that the assigned group has wider gender pay gaps and that a greater proportion of these gaps is attributable to discrimination. From this perspective, market liberalization seems to work to women's advantage.
We began our investigation with the conjecture that wage decentralization and reduced levels of government involvement in Chinese labor markets lead to an increase in discrimination against women. Our finding that wage gaps are largest in the most liberalized sector, when taken together with the results in Maurer-Fazio et al. (1999) and Li and Gustafsson (1999) that the gender wage gap increases over the course of the reforms, appears to lend support to this hypothesis. However, when we take into account the differences in the wage structure, much of the larger gender wage gaps in the jointventure and collective sectors is explained by a greater degree of wage inequality. There is very little difference, by sector, in the mean female percentile ranking on the male residual wage scale, i.e., the mean female percentile after controlling for observable characteristics, as the mean percentiles range from 41.6 in the joint-venture sector to 46.6 in the state sector. These rankings are extraordinarily high by international comparison and support the contention of Meng (2000) that programs promoting gender equity in the socialist period were effective and durable. Our analysis of the relationship between the degree of market liberalization and the size and composition of the gender wage gaps lends no empirical support to the hypothesis of reform-induced increases in labor market discrimination against women.
Endnotes
2 The data in our empirical analysis was collected in 1992, which is well into the reform process in China.
3 Liu et al. (2000) employ a similar strategy to compute and decompose gender wage gaps for private sector and public sector firms in Shanghai and Jinan. They find the size of the gap in wages left unexplained after taking into account differences in observed characteristics to be larger in the private sector than in the state sector. However, the share of this unexplained gap as a fraction of the total wage gap is smaller in the private sector than in the state sector. 4 Confucian doctrine takes a very hierarchical view of society. Key human relationships link superiors to subordinates with sons subordinate to fathers, subjects subordinate to rulers, and wives subordinate to husbands. In the first century C.E., the famous female historian and scholar, Ban Zhao, consolidated existing attitudes towards women into a set of prescriptive norms for women's lives, Nujie, (Precepts for Women). Ban Zhao unequivocally stated the position of women as lowly and weak and destined to serve others. The effects of her writing on attitudes about women's roles in society intensified in the Neo-Confucianism period (Lee, 1994) . Confucian cosmological beliefs determined women's place and status in pre-modern China (Croll, 1995) and still play a role in shaping gender norms in contemporary China. 5 Women were paid substantially less than men in China's pre-socialist society. Rawski (1989) studies the large concentration of cotton textile mills in Jiangsu Province in prewar China. The mills employed large numbers of young women recruited from the surrounding rural areas, paying wages that closely tracked rural wages. Occupational segregation by gender in the mills makes it difficult to explain differences in pay using differences in skill, experience and gender. However, Rawski presents data on annual wages paid to male and female farm workers in forty-four of Jiangsu's counties for the period between 1923 and 1932 in which women's earnings vary from 61 to 65 percent of men's as calculated from Table 6 .7 (Rawski 1989) . Arnold (1926) reports male wage premiums varying from zero to 400 percent across similar but broadly defined occupations in China. A number of historical accounts and case studies of particular industries and mills also provide additional anecdotal information on women's pay in pre-socialist China. Honig (1986) examines women's working lives in the Shanghai cotton mills in the first half of the twentieth century. Women and men tended to do different jobs, although the jobs considered women's work or men's work varied from mill to mill. As wages fell during the depression of the 1930s, Honig reports that there was a corresponding change in the division of labor as women were hired to do some of the tasks formerly done by men and that women's wages fell while men's wages rose. 6 Contrast the labor force participation of Chinese women with that of their U.S. counterparts. As recently as 1970, women's labor force participation in the U.S. stood at 48 percent for white women, and 59 percent for black women. Even by 1995, the labor force participation rate had risen to 72 percent for white women and 70 percent for black women. Only American women with at least some postgraduate education had participation rates approaching or exceeding the 90 percent witnessed in China (Blau, Ferber, and Winkler, 1997) .
tenure along with their squared values, the unexplained portion of the wage differential rises to 33 percent in the state-owned sector, to 51 percent in the collective sector, and to 52 percent in the joint-venture sector. 17 Zveglich, Rodgers, and Roders (1997) analyze changes in gender earnings gaps in Taiwan's relatively unfettered labor markets. Taiwan shares a common cultural heritage but differs substantially in terms of institutional setting; comparisons are thus revealing. They find that the mean ratio of women's to men's wages stayed constant throughout the period from 1978 to 1992 at 65 percent, which is a level substantially below any subset of our data. Over the period, women improved their mean levels of education and work experience relative to men and they demonstrated no decline in their commitment to the labor force. However, the unexplained component of the gender-pay gap increased over time from 37.4 to 57.7 percent of the total gap. Zveglich et al. (1997) suggest that, in Taiwan's relatively competitive labor environment, discrimination against women increased over this period. 18 In an Oaxaca or Neumark decomposition, a negative unexplained wage gap means that women receive, on average, a wage premium over men, unaccounted for by differences in observed characteristics. 19 The average wage gap is 63 yuan for assigned jobs in joint enterprises and 16 yuan for competitive jobs. Using the lowest estimate of the discriminatory portion in assigned jobs yields a discriminatory wage gap of 18 yuan. Using the higher Neumark estimate of the discriminatory wage gap in competitive jobs yields a discriminatory gap of less than 10 yuan per month. 20 Using a common state-enterprise base means that inter-sectoral differences in the observed and unobserved prices are weighted using the collective or joint weights, as appropriate, while inter-sectoral differences in gender-specific factors are weighted using the base category, or state enterprise weights. See Blau and Kahn, (1996) , for details. 21 By this measure, the economic standing of Chinese women in all ownership types compares quite favorably with the relative standing of women in other countries. In the international comparison of Blau and Kahn (1996) , women's mean ranking in the male residual distribution ranged from a low of 18.5 percent in Norway to a high of 37.5 percent in Switzerland, numbers that are far lower than our findings for China (Blau and Kahn, 1996) . 
